

Encoding Individual Source Sequences for the Wiretap Channel

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Objectives

- ♠ Fundamental limits for transmitting **individual sequences** over the WTC.
- ♠ Fundamental limits on the amount of local randomness at the encoder.
- ♠ Extension: side info at the decoder with leakage to the wiretapper.

Related Work

The WTC


- ♣ Wyner (1975): degraded BC; secrecy capacity.
- ♣ Csiszár & Korner (1978): general broadcast channels.
- ♣ Leung-Yan-Cheong & Hellman (1978): The Gaussian WTC.
- ♣ Ozarow & Wyner (1985): WTC type II.
- ♣ Yamamoto (1989): secret sharing with two channels.
- ♣ Yamamoto (1997): rate–distortion + private key.

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Individual Sequences

- ♣ Ziv (1978): coding thms for individual sequences.
- ♣ Ziv (1980): rate-distortion for individual sequences.
- ♣ Ziv (1984): same + side info.
- ♣ Merhav (2013): encryption for individual sequences.
- ♣ Merhav (2014): data processing thms for individual sequences.

The Model



The Model (Cont'd)

Finite-state stochastic encoder

$$\Pr\{X_{im+1}^{im+m} = x^m | u_{ik+1}^{ik+k} = u^k, s_i^e = s\} = P(x^m | u^k, s), \quad i = 0, 1, 2, \dots$$

$$s_{i+1}^e = h(u_{ik+1}^{ik+k}, s_i^e) \quad i = 0, 1, 2, \dots$$

Finite-state decoder

$$v_{ik+1}^{ik+k} = f(y_{im+1}^{im+m}, s_i^d)$$

$$s_{i+1}^d = g(y_{im+1}^{im+m}, s_i^d).$$

$$|\mathcal{S}^e| = q_e, \quad |\mathcal{S}^d| = q_d$$

The bandwidth expansion factor (BEF):

$$\lambda = \frac{m}{k}.$$

System Requirements

Reliability

$$P_b \triangleq \frac{1}{k} \sum_{i=1}^k \Pr\{V_i \neq u_i\} \leq \epsilon_r$$

Security

$$\max_{\mu} I_{\mu}(U^n; Z^N) \leq n\epsilon_s, \quad N = n\lambda$$

Lempel-Ziv (LZ) Complexity

The [incremental parsing procedure](#) sequentially parses u^n into distinct phrases, such that each new phrase is the shortest string that has not been obtained before as a phrase.

Let $c(u^n)$ denote the number of resulting phrases. For example, if

$$u^{10} = (0000110110)$$

then incremental parsing yields

$$(0, 00, 01, 1, 011, 0)$$

and so, $c(u^{10}) = 6$.

We define the [LZ complexity](#) of u^n , as

$$\rho_{LZ}(u^n) \triangleq \frac{c(u^n) \log c(u^n)}{n}$$

Converse Bound

Theorem: If \exists stochastic encoder with q_e states and a decoder with q_d states that satisfy the reliability constraint and the security constraint, then

$$\lambda \geq \frac{\rho_{LZ}(u^n) - \Delta(\epsilon_r) - \epsilon_s - \zeta_n(q_d, k)}{C_s}, \quad (1)$$

where

$$\Delta(\epsilon_r) \triangleq h_2(\epsilon_r) + \epsilon_r \cdot \log(\alpha - 1), \quad (2)$$

and

$$\zeta_n(q_d, k) \rightarrow 0$$

for fixed q_d and k .

Discussion

- ♣ Irrelevance of q_e .
- ♣ Decay rate of $\zeta_n(q_d, k)$ is slow.
- ♣ Achievability: V-F LZ compression + channel coding for the WTC.

Minimum Local Randomness

Consider the following representation of the encoder

$$x_{im+1}^{im+m} = a(u_{ik+1}^{ik+k}, s_i^{\mathbf{e}}, b_{i\mathbf{j}+1}^{i\mathbf{j}+\mathbf{j}}),$$

where the b 's are purely random bits.


Theorem: Let λ meet the lower bound above. If \exists encoder with q_e states and a decoder with q_d states that satisfy the reliability constraint and the security constraint, then

$$j \geq mI(X^*; Z^*) - k\epsilon_s - \frac{\log q_e}{\ell}$$

where X^* is the random variable that achieves C_s and ℓ is the achiever of $\zeta_n(q_d, k)$.

Wyner's coding scheme achieves this lower bound.

Side Information



Conditional LZ Complexity

$c(u^n, w^n)$ = number of distinct phrases of (u^n, w^n) .

$c(w^n)$ = resulting number of distinct phrases of w^n ,

$w(l)$ = the l -th distinct w -phrase, $l = 1, 2, \dots, c(w^n)$.

$c_l(u^n | w^n)$ = number of distinct u -phrases that jointly appear with $w(l)$.

$$\rho_{LZ}(u^n | w^n) \triangleq \frac{1}{n} \sum_{l=1}^{c(w^n)} c_l(u^n | w^n) \log c_l(u^n | w^n).$$

Achievable Lower Bound

Theorem: If \exists a stochastic encoder with q_e states and a decoder with q_d states that satisfy the reliability constraint and the security constraint, then

$$\lambda \geq \frac{\rho_{LZ}(u^n|w^n) - \Delta(\epsilon_r) - \epsilon_s - \eta_n(q_e \cdot q_d, k)}{C_s}.$$

Discussion

- ♣ Irrelevance of the SI channel $Q_{\dot{W}|W}$. Same as if $\dot{w} = w$.
- ♣ Now depends on q_e too (unless $\dot{w} = w$).
- ♣ Achievability: if \dot{w} is available to the encoder - LZ with SI. Otherwise, needs a little feedback.